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AS I APPROACHED THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, I SOUGHT FOUR KEY OBJECTIVES
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OF WHICH THE AGREEENT FULFILLS:
ALL
- FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE SALT 11 AGREEMENT ESTABLISHES THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY IN TOTAL NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS AND IN OTHER
IMPORTANT CATEGORIES:
C
-IT REDUCES THE NUMBER OF DELIVERY VEHICLES PERMITTED EACH
SIDE WHICH IN THE SOVIET CASE WILL REQUIRE IT TO DISMANTLE ABOUT
250 LAUNCHERS:
--IT CONSTRAINS THE QUALITATIVE ARMS RACE-FOR EXAMPLE, BY LIMITING EACH SIDE TO ONE NEW ICBM DURING THE LIFE OF THE TREATY. AT THE SAME TIME, IT DOES NOT PREVENT US FROM UNDERTAKING NEEDED MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS, INCLUDING THE STEPS I WILL DECIDE TO TAKE IN DEALING WITH THE INCREASING VULNERABILITY OF OUR MINUTEMAN
MISSLES: AND
-THE AGREEMENT MAKES VERIFICATION EASIER AND MORE SECURE WHICH, ALONG WITH OUR OWN EFFORTS, GIVES ME FULL CONFIDENCE THAT THE
AGREEMENT CAN BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED.
EACH OF THESE PROVISIONS IS A SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE OVER SALT
1. .AND I BELIEVE THEY GIVE US A FIRM BASIS FOR STRATEGIC SECURITY
DURING THE LIFE OF THE TREATY.
THE AGREEMENT ALSO PROVIDES IMPORTANT POLITICAL BENEFITS.
THE LIMITS WILL GIVE US GREATER CERTAINTY IN OUR STRATEGIC PLANNING, AND THUS CAN HELP TO REDUCE MISUNDERSTANDINGS. I ALSO HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WITHOUT THE TREATY I WOULD HAVE TO ASK CONGRESS TO FUND FAR
MORE EXTENSIVE NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS THAN WILL BE REQUIRED IF SALT PASSES THE SENATE, WHICH WOULD OF NECESSITY REDUCE FUNDS AND EFFORT. NEEDED FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES. AND AS I LOOK TO THE FUTURE, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT SOVIET LEADERS COMING TO POWER IN
THE NEXT FEW YEARS FIND THEMSELVES CONSTRAINED BY THE SALT 11 LIMITS, RATHER THAN BY ONLY THE MUCH LESS RIGOROUS STANDARDS OF SALT I, OR NO LIMITS AT ALL.
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