GRS 330'
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FM F C O 29191OZ MAY 79
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 29 MAY.
807 TOP COPY
Hekaya
RECEIVED IN RÉGIS BY NO.
INT
31 MAY 1979
DESK OFFICER
No
PA
·44.5
511
REGISTRY Action Tale
INFO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE (S OF S), PRIORITY UKIS NEW YORK UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON PARIS BONN UKREP BRUSSELS HONG KONG PEKING HANOI
BANGKOK- KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE CANBERRA WELLINGTON
INFO SAVING TO MANILA JAKARTA,
YOUR TEL NO 311: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES.
see 839
1. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL SUMMONED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT 5.30 TODAY. HE TOLD LUNKOV OF HMG'S SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, ESPECIALLY HONG KONG, AND ASKED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TO CHANGE ITS POLICY. WE WERE NOT SUGGESTING THAT PEOPLE SHOULD BE PREVENTED FROM LEAVING VIETNAM: BUT THE EXODUS SHOULD BE PLANNED AND ORDERLY AND VIETNAM SHOULD CEASE FORCING ETHNIC CHINESE TO LEAVE. PEOPLE WERE LEAVING WITH NOWHERE TO GO AND MANY WERE DYING AT SEA. WE HAD ALREADY MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE VIETNAMESE: IT REFLECTED BADLY ON THEM THAT PEOPLE WERE LEAVING THEIR COUNTRY IN SUCH NUMBERS. IN PARTICULAR HONG KONG WAS ALREADY OVERCROWDED AND THE SITUATION WAS
BECOMING DESPERATE.
2. LUNKOV UNDERTOOK TO REPORT BUT HELD OUT LITTLE HOPE OF SOVIET HELP. HE SAID THE VIETNAMESE WERE A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT DISCUSS THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS WITH US. WE HAD BEEN LISTENING TO QUOTE MISINFORMATION UNQUOTE FROM THE CHINESE, WHO WERE EXAGGERATING AS USUAL. IN ANY CASE, WHAT COULD THE VIET- NAME SE DO? MANY OF THE REFUGEES WERE SUPPORTERS OF THE OLD REGIME WHO WANTED TO LEAVE. THE SITUATION WAS AKIN TO THAT AFTER THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE DELIBERATELY EXPELLING ETHNIC CHINESE OR WERE IN ANY WAY RESPONSIBLE. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT WE SAW THE PROBLEM FROM DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW.
CONFIDENTIAL
1.3.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.