TNAG-0886-FCO40-1096-Refugees-from-Vietnam-in-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-boat-people-1979 — Page 99

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راسا

With

HKK 243/1

Cambodia and Vietnam

64 Lord Carrington said that British thinking on Vietnam

f

was largely confined to the refugee problem, with particular

There were now some 30,000

reference to Hong Kong.

Kong,which

refugees in Hong Kong, which could not really support them. Sir M Palliser added that it was virtually impossible to

stop the flow, although arresting ships captains had some

deterrent affut.

Mr Vance was convinced that the problem would get worse:

refugees from Cambodia would increase while

89280 Dd 532113 200M 2/79 StS

سير

from Virth to yould remain big. Some leg of

The US

fcine the outflow from Victon was essential.

gecogling 7,000 Indo-Chinese refugees a month. This

V4 makirch that

great deul un there was a limit on how far the US cou

Although increasing humanitarian problems help to some extent.

ourt to help mor, at least financially. But he doubted

to give much help. r other countries could be brought to

th Americans had done little, while France was cutting back.

believed that the West should support the setting up of

rocessing centre on an island and hoped that all would

tinue to work with the UNHCR.

The

The

Mr Vance beloved that it was necessary to talk direct

Vietnam about regularising the flow of refugees.

anese had undertaken to do so. They had already threatened

cut off aid to Vietnam if Soviet bases were expanded and

arged

US had now ad them to extend this threat to cover the

ugee problem. There was a need to re-open a dialogue between the West

Vietnam, who do not wish to be dependent on the USSR or

China.

Lord Carrington commented that the French should be in the refugle problem, but c to help,

34)

de Sir Il Palliser commented that their

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