TNAG-0884-FCO40-1094-Refugees-from-Vietnam-in-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-boat-people-1979 — Page 64

GRS

CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HONG KONG C211252 MAY 79

TO IMMEDIATE JAKARTA

(Giz

HKK 243/1

TELEGRAM NUMBER 5 OF 2 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE F CO

INFO PRIORITY BANGKOK, MANILA, SINGAPORE, KUALA LUMPUR,

WASHINGTON, UKMIS GENEVA.

INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON

YOUR TELNO 113 TO FCO: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES.

see (627 654

1. YOUR PARA 3 # THE MAIN ARGUMENTS WE SUGGEST FOR HONG KONG HAVING SOME ACCESS IN PRINCIPLE TO THE SPECIAL PROCESSING CENTRE

(SPC) ARE

A. THIS NEW COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE PARTICIPATION BY A PLACE WHICH HAS RECEIVED

A SIGNIFICANT AND GROWING PART OF THE REFUGEE BURDEN (6,143 ARRIVALS

IN APRIL):

B. HONG KONG WOULD ONLY EXPECT SMALL AND PRINCIPALLY SYMBOLIC NUMBERS IN A CAMP OF 10,000. HOW MANY AND WHICH REFUGEES WERE TRANSFERRED FROM HONG KONG WOULD DEPEND ON CRITERIA WHICH

- HAVE NOT YET BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED.

C. IF HONG KONG IS SEEN PUBLICLY TO BE DENIED ACCESS THIS WILL INCREASE PRESSURE LOCALLY FOR MORE RESTRICTIVE POLICIES. WE ASSUME

THIS WOULD NOT BE WELCOME TO UNHCR. ASEAN COUNTRIES MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF MORE RESTRICTIVE POLICIES HERE.

2. FOR FCO. WE TRUST THERE IS ALSO A CARROT AND STICK ARGUMENT ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE UK TO CONTRIBUTE FUNDS OR PLACES FOR ANY

SPC TO WHICH HONG KONG DID NOT HAVE ACCESS,

CONFIDENTIAL

13.WE