Annex D
REPORT BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR SECURITY ON HIS MEETING WITH
THE MASTER OF M.V. 'HURY FONG' ON 18TH JANUARY, 1979 ON BOARD HMS
WASPERTON
Pre-Meeting
I left HMS Tamer on board HMS Wasperton at 7 a.0.
on 18th January accompanied by Senior Chinese Language Officer, Mr. Yen Shu-tung.
2.
At approximately 9 a.r. HMS Wasperten reached the vicinity of the MV 'Huey Fong" where HMS Monkton was waiting. Contact was made with the Secretary for Security and the Political Adviser in the Tamar Ops. Room and I was advised that the U.S. Authorities were trying to obtain a Taiwan Government view from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taiwan at 11 a.r. that moming. It was not anticipated that there would be any cutcome before 12 noon. It was therefore agreed that an approach to the master of the "Huey Fong' would be deferred until after that time. S. for S. also informed me that at 9 a.m. the raster intended to send a message to the Authoritics in Taiwan. l'e agreed that if the response of the Taivenese Authorities to these approaches were not forthcoming, or inconclusive, we should procced as planned. If the response was positive only paras. 1-2 of the message at Appendix 1 would be delivered.
3.
HMS Monkton and HMS Wasperton thereupon withdrew from the immediate vicinity of the Huey Fong' and anchored off Po Tbi within sight of the 'Huey Fong'.
4.
Shortly after 1.30 p.r. 6. for S. informed me from Tamar Ops. Room that the cable had been sent by the raster but that we had no copy of it.
It was not thought however that the cable represented the true position cr the views of the refugees. The approach by the U.S. officials to the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs was at the mid level and it was not thought any positive response would be forthcoming. It was not envisaged that there would be any official chenge in the Taiwan policy regarding refugees without decision being taken at a high level.
5.
In the light of the assessment that either no positive response was expected from the MFA in Taiwan, or that there would be no response at all, or that there would be a response but not sufficient to defer the action that had been planned, 5. for S. and P.. had agreed that a delay in making an approach to the master of the 'Huey Fong' would not be justified.
6.
WC refore agreed that I should proceed as planned with informing the master of paras. 1 4 of the agreed version of the message and then, depending on his reaction, inform hir of paras. 5 and 6. Para. 7 would be nut across by means of question and answer. The important point was that it would be the raster who had to make the decision as to what happene¿ next.
1.
Irrangements were accordingly made for the master and representatives of the refugees to come to HMS esperton which had by this time taken up its former rcsition near the 'ikuey Yong'. A Gemini was sent across to the 'Huey "ong' and a messago vas passed by lou? hailer inviting
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