CONFIDENTIAL
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well a really good case for an island processing centre. agree. I told him that in any case the UK would support the establishment of a centre but that we should be unable to offer any further resettlement places at this stage beyond what we have offered already.
4.
He said the Canadians hoped that financial contributions to the cost would be made on an "assessed "basis. Canada saw this as a means of internationalising the problem. I said we were ourselves still considering this point.
Lie I gathered that the Canadians were not as keen on r Hartling as they were on his predecessor. Mr Bell said he was too "passive"; he simply wanted to do what governments wanted and was slow to come up with ideas: his organisations were inclined to over-extend themselves eg in promoting some self-sufficiency schemes and getting away from their more traditional role of protection and immediate assistance. I said we were happy with Mr Hartling's performance though never failed to criticise aspects of his programmes where necessary. We were content with the UNHCR's self-sufficiency schemes and even financed some of them. I said I thought these were essential for refugees who were long-term inmates of refugee camps. Their morale was generally low and they needed this extra input from the UNHCR. As far as Mr Hartling's "passiveness" was concerned, I said I thought he was right to go slow on the island centre scheme and to be very careful of his action in this regard.
13 March 1979
CC
Chancery, UKMis Geneva
Chancery, Ottawa
NAmD
SEAD
HKGD
P Morgan
UN Department
CONFIDENTIAL
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