CONFIDENTIAL ##
57.
16
If the Government had been faced with the need to hold two refugee ships off the Square Boundary at the same time the strain on Police and Naval vessels would have become intolerable unless both ships had been anchored close together. This would create difficulties if they were within sight of one another and
they were being handled differently or in a different time sequence. Even then, the volume of supplies needed by the ships might have been beyond the capacity of the helicopters for more than a short period.
58.
Some modest difficulties were encountered in dealing with medical cases from the ship which had to be brought ashore for hospital treatment. Since the refugees involved were not authorised to land they had to be held in custodial wards, the capacity of which was very limited. There were never more than about twenty people from the ship in hospital, but it became apparent that even a fairly small outbreak of disease on board involving hospitalisation would have been difficult to cope with, especially in poor weather.
59.
The command and control arrangements for the operation worked well after some initial difficulties. These were resolved by the creation of an Operations Group which took over the planning and coordination function which had previously been split between the Policy Group and the C.C.C. shifts. The latter proved to be insufficiently versed in the specialised emergency procedures and delicate political background. The lack of direct communication between the C.C.C. and the operational scene was a disadvantage which needs to be rectified at an early stage in any future operation of the same kind.
60.
The presence of the Director of Information Services on the Policy Group ensured that the presentational aspects of the decisions which were taken were given due weight both locally and internationally. In general the flow of information to the media was satisfactory and achieved a good measure of support for the Government's position. There were occasions when inaccurate reporting, misconstruction of what was released or speculation, caused reports or broadcasts to be unhelpful to the Administration's aim of getting the ship to sail, either because they raised the hopes of those on board or because they engendered public opposition to keeping the ship out. Arrangements should have been made so that Radio Television Hong Kong could have been involved in putting out authoratitive reports. (This has now been done). A daily briefing of the media by Information Services Department staff fully acquainted with events and with good continuity might have helped prevent misleading reports. A forum in which senior officials could have explained the Government's policy would also have been useful. Finally some form of restreint on press comment for operational reasons is required in circumstances in which either leaks or premature Press action might lead to loss of life or injury either to security forces or refugees.
CONFIDENTIAL
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