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It also became nccessary to counter the propaganda which was disseminated by those on board the ship in their telephone communications with the media, and which was designed to generate sympathy for the refugees. For example, on 27th December representatives of the refugees spoke to RTV, the Hong Kong Standard, Reuters, the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation, the Kung Sheung Daily, the Fai Pao and the Mainichi newspaper of Tokyo. Amongst other things they claimed that they had nothing to eat, that Taiwan had told them to ask the Hong Kong Government for help, that sixty percent of those on board were children and that Government officials had broken off a meeting with them. The Policy Group considered jamming the ship's radio communications but decided against this.
50.
Whenever the weather permitted, a launch was organised by G.I.S. to take photographers and journalists to the scene during reprovisioning operations. This resulted in extensive coverage which emphasised the Government's humane treatment of the refugees and reduced public pressure to let the ship in.
51.
On 28th December, the Policy Group set up a Publicity Group, comprising the Director of Information Services, the Deputy Secretary for Security and the Assistant Political Adviser, to decide what information should be released to the media and to prepare Press statements. The Publicity Group assumed that any information released would quickly reach the Huey Fong' and it had to consider the likely effect which it would have on the resolve of the Master and the refugees not to sail. this respect, speculation and inaccurate reporting by some sections of the media sometimes frustrated the Governments's intention of presenting a determined attitude to those on board the ship. For example, it became known that a camp was being prepared at Kai Tak and this inevitably gave rise to speculation that a decision had been made to admit the refugees.
52.
In
In order to encourage the international Press to focus on the principles underlying the Government's position, rather than just on human interest aspects, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was asked on 3rd January to issue guidance to overseas posts based on material provided from Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Commissioner in London was asked to send letters on Government policy to newspapers in the U.K.
53.
In general, public opinion in Hong Kong continued to support the Government's refusal to admit the vessel even though the arrival of cold and wet weather on 15th January gave rise to more sympathy for the plight of the refugees. The Policy Group considered that there would be considerable public fears about the effect of being forced to allow the ship into harbour. They insisted, therefore, that publicity must be given before admittance to the U.K.'s offer to resettle 1,000 refugees, to the new legislation which rendered the Master liable to severe penalties and to the fact that the refugees would initially be detained as illegal immigrants.
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