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PERDONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
atout his
Juviu comm
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH
Government Secretariat
HONG KONG
UNS 245
29 JAN1979
INDEX
A
Telephone 01-235 8651
HIE 243/1
Your reference
I
Our reference
Date 29 January 1979
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REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM
1. It's been an interesting couple of weeks! passengers have been landed I should very much welcome your thoughts
Now that the Huey Fong on how you see the Hong Kong Government's policy (on the admission of boat refugees) developing in the weeks and months to come or, at least, some indication of how you think future big boatloads can be dealt with. 2. Despite the landing of the Huey Fong group, I see that the long Kong Government are sticking firmly to the first-port-of-call principle for perfectly good reasons. I hope, however, that this will not be
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taken advantage of by racketeers should the new legislation not prove. sufficient to deter them. It needs little imagination to realise that' it must surely be a push-over for racketeers to ensure that Hong Kong is legitimately entered on manifests as the first scheduled port of call. I have no doubt that you and the Hong Kong authorities have indeed already considered this problem in denth. of refugees are, 1 think, more than likely to head for Hong Kong: One Other big boatloads is bound to atk now long the first-port-of-call principle can be applied without placing you (and us) in an intolerable position? far, adhering to some basic humanitarian ground rules, you and we have
So managed to get by through handling matters on a case by case basis, but I really wonder if this will be enough for the future. Some kind of alternative strategy might be advisable as an additional deterrent. I think most reasonable people now recognise the intolerable burden which Hong Kong is shouldering.
3. I hope you will not consider any of the foregoing as an attempt to encourage the Hong Kong Government to alter its present policy. That is certainly not the intention. At this stage, our concern is
to know how you see the future course of events and to have an idea of the various options which might be open to you, the point being that decisions taken in Hong Kong, do have their effect (even though at one or two remove) on our own policy.
1 Morgan
United Nations Department
AL COMPELEITELAL
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