GPS 730
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PM UKMIS GENEVA 021830Z JAN 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 6 OF 39/1/79
INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
HKK 243/1
RECEIVED IN REG..!
11 JAN 1979
DESK OF CE INDEX
RY
RS.
Action
en
PA)
73
52
YOUR TELMO 5: HUEY FONG
No
ar
1. AT OUR MEETING THIS AFTERNOON, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OPENED BY SAYING THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE HUEY FONG CASE. HIS ORGANISATION WERE DOING THEIR BEST. THEY WERE URGING THE AMERICANS TO HELP THE, QUEUE IN HONG KONG TO MOVE. THE HOLIDAY PERIOD HAD SLOWED THINGS
UP BUT THE US HAD SAID THEY WOULD TAKE AWAY THE 1203 REFUGEES
IN HONG KONG THEY HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED BY THE END OF FEBRUARY. HARTLING WOULD ASK THEM TO MOVE QUICKER AND TO TAKE MORE.
2. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER WAS STRUCK BY TWO POINTS IN THE GOVERNOR'S LETTER. FIRST THE REFERENCE TO THE FIRST PORT OF CALL POLICY MEANT THAT STRICTLY SPEAKING HONG KONG COULD BE ASKED TO TAKE THE REFUGEES FROM THE TUNG AN. SECONDLY THE REFERENCE TO SURVIVORS CLAIMED TO BE FROM SHIPWRECKS SUGGESTED THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE HARDENING THEIR POLICY. THE FACT WAS THAT THESE REFUGEES WERE THERE NOW AND COULD HARDLY DE LEFT IN THEIR PRESENT STATE INDEFINITELY.
3. 1 REPLIED THAT HONG KONG ALREADY HAD UNIQUE DIFFICULTIES OVER REFUGEES IN GENERAL AND WOULD RISK PLACING ITSELF IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION IF IT BECAME WIDELY REGARDED AS A SOFT OPTION FOR FUTURE ORGANISED EXODUS BY SHIPS FROM VIETNAM. I WENT ON TO MAKE THE OTHER POINTS AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TUR. (1 SUBSEQUENTLY LEFT A SPEAKING NOTE.)
4. HARTLING SAID THAT HE RECOGNISED THAT THERE WAS PROBABLY AN
ORGANISED RECKET. BUT A SUFFICIENT SIGNAL TO THE RACKETEERS HAD
ALREADY BEEN GIVEN BY THE DELAY IMPOSED UPON THE HUEY FONG. THIS
WAS COSTING THE ORGANISERS MONEY AND SHOWED THAT HONG KONG WAS NOT
A SOFT OPTION. IT WAS CERTAINLY NO BAD THING THAT THE SIGNAL HAD
BEEN GIVEN.
CONFIDENTAL
DENTAL
15. HE EX PRESSED
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