TNAG-0877-FCO40-1087-Refugees-from-Vietnam-in-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-boat-people-1979 — Page 13

CONFIDENTIAL

4. WHATEVER HAPPENS TO THE HUEY FONG WE SEE OUR LOCAL PROBLEMS

GETTING WORSE NOT BETTER OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. NOT OY ARE

WE FACING WHAT IS CLEARLY AN ORGANISED TRAFFIC ARRANGED WITH THE CONNIVANCE, IF NOT SUPPORT, OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. WE ALSO FACE THE PROSPECT OF MORE OF THOSE ORIGINALLY FROM VIETNAM MOVING ON FROM CHINA. WE MAY PERSUADE THE CHINESE TO TAKE BACK

SOME OF THESE BUT I AM NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF THEIR

TAKING MANY.

5. WE NEED TWO TYPES OF ACTION TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM. THE

FIRST IS A VERY SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN RESETTLEMENT OFFERS BOTH FROM THE U.K AND ELSEWHERE (SEE MY TELNO.62). THE SECOND IS AN EFFORT TO PIN RESPONSIBILITY WHERE IT REALLY LIES, 1.E ON VIETNAM THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES NEED TO BE PERSU ADED TO MODERATE THEIR POLICIES TOWARDS ETHNIC CHINESE SEMI-COLON TO CEASE THEIR OWN INVOLVEMENT IN ENCOURAGING AN OUTFLOW SEMI-COLON AND TO MAKE PROPER ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ORDERLY MOVEMENT OF A MUCH SMALLER NUMBER WHO HAVE REASON TO LEAVE AND WHO WILL BE ACCEPTED BY THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

6. ON GREATER ONWARD MOVEMENT YOU MIGHT CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING

POINTS:

(1) TRANSIT CENTRE. ALTHOUGH THE UNHCR DOES NOT APPEAR TO

LIKE THIS IDEA (UKMIS GENEVA TELNO.1046 TO FCO, PARA,5), THERE

IS NO DOUBT THAT A CENTRE WOULD MAKE A MAJOR DIFFERENCE TO THE

ATTITUDE OF PORTS IN THE REGION INCLUDING OURSELVES. THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTY IS THAT NOBODY WISHES TO OFFER TO HOUSE THE CENTRE. WE HAVE HEARD IN CONFIDENCE FROM THE U.S CONSULATE- GENERAL THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS CONSULTING U.S MISSIONS OV

THE IDEA OF A CENTRE IN THE PHILIPPINES BACKED BY AN

INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF COUNTRIES WILLING TO OFFER RESETTLEMENT PLACES. THE U.S EMBASSY MAY THEREFORE RAISE THIS

WITH YOU IN DUE COURSE. ALTERNATIVELY, HAS OKINAWA BEEN

CONSIDERED ? THE JAPANESE MIGHT FEEL THAT THEY COULD GAIN

POLITICAL MILEAGE WITH ASEAN BY SUCH AN OFFER.

-2- CONFIDENTIAL

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