CONFIDENTIAL
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5. It was not only officials who were upset. Tan Sri Manickavasagam, the very senior Minister of Communications (now Transport), had been unable to see the Secretary of State for Trade in London in April 1977 as Mr Edmund Dell was away, but it seems to have rankled that he was received only by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary. Dr Mahathir, the Deputy Prime
Minister, who had taken the decision to agree to British terms over the DC10s in Manickavasagam's absence, ran into criticism from his colleagues and officials and there was general Ministerial dissatis- faction that, despite Malaysian attempts to arouse political interest, our side had treated the matter as largely technical.
6.
The British side viewed the matter differently. Traffic arrangements with Malaysia had grown up haphazardly, largely because of the split between MAS and SIA in 1973, one of the long-term effects of Singapore's break with Malaysia in 1965. MAS was out- earning British airlines by some £10 million a year and MAS were cheating though perhaps only like many other airlines by filling their London-bound flights with passengers from Australia under the Sixth Freedom and also indulging in illegal rebating practices
It was, therefore, right that the negotiation should be realistic. On the other hand, the Malaysians had some grounds for complaint, though they never mentioned them specifically. There was nothing in the UK/Malaysia arrangements worked out in 1973 to prevent them switching from Boeing 707s to DC10s on their regional routes to Hong Kong. However, at the request of Cathay Pacific, the British side in 1976 rejected a Malaysian
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