TNAG-0863-FCO40-1073-Involvement-of-Hong-Kong-in-air-services-agreements-1979 — Page 75

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in London.

4.

The

The Malaysians' appeals to sentiment and the emotion that

characterised their complaints about our alleged neglect did not

obscure the fact that in air services terms (the terms within

which all governments, developing and developed, normally conduct

such negotiations) the Malaysians had no case for extra services.

Take for example the bland request (see paragraph 6 of the des-

patch) for a switch from Boeing 707s to DC10s, as if this was

something the Malaysians could expect to get for nothing, when

it meant something like doubling MAS capacity on the route.

Air Services Agreement did not mention the possibility of a change

of aircraft because at the time of its signature larger aircraft

were not yet flying. But capacity, not just frequency of flights,

is the normal measurement used in allocating services to each

side in an Air Services Agreement. Again the argument that British

Airways should have made more use of its unlimited capacity on

the London route is unsound traffic projections showed no scope

for big increases in capacity and there was no advantage for BA

in flying half empty 'planes. The figures attached at annex to

this submission show how the balance lay, with the Malaysians

out-earning BA and CPA by 2 to 1 or more, over the years.

5. One lesson from this is the need for great patience and

tact in negotiating with Malaysian officials. At the talks in

/London

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