or at a time that does not suit us. The preparation of briefing also reprozents a heavy burden of work, research and office services, and it is sometimes, especially when several commitments come close together, not practicable to turn on to it 23 much trained, expert staff and ancillary typing/photocopying capacity as we would wish. Furthermore, briefing is very much affected by moves and developments in the period of run-up to negotiations, sometimes late in the day, so that slow and elaborate pre-briefing procedures will not fully cover that nced. Finally, it is characteristically the case that the true opportunities, priorities and sticking points on the other side and by all the Eritish airlines - only show up at all clearly under the pressure of bargaining during the negotiations. While strategic planning and trying to reckon with the other side's moves in advance is wise, there are limits to what can be done. It is impracticable, and can be a waste of effort, to try to plot all of that out fully in advance. invite Ministers to commit themselves in advance to a whole permutation of steps
It would be very difficult to related to still quite hypothetical situations. The reason we have expert teams, with Colonial and airline advisers, is to grasp and react intelligently to develop- ments as negotiations proceed, and to report back olearly if further instructions or decisions from HMG are needed.
29. There are thus some factors which can limit the detail of pre-briefing procedures, especially tactically, but, given that HMG already makes provisions for consultations with Hong Kong, EG is entirely ready to discuss any practical proposals for improving the mechanics of consultation. For example, we have before now had ..g. Ministers as well as officials from other Colonies present at UK negotiation and should not object to similar arrangements for appropriate for no officials for Hong Kong. (If an official person attends, arrangements may be necessary as to official secrets and regard would doubtless be paid to avoiding any conflict of private interest.) (Para. 24).
30. Before concludingcconsideration of this section of the Hong Kong paper, MG cannot but express surprise at the sweeping nature of the references to inadequate consultation in the past. These do not accord with thę efforts made by HQ to permit consultation and the references are made without supporting evidence of how many particular cases have given Hong Kong cause for concern. Hong Kong might care to cite all the specific instances which give rise to the following points made in the paper.
HONG KONG PAPER
Why is it necessary to define the Hong Kong advisers'right to be heard? (Para.16)
When have "drastic and irrevocable" changes in "agreed briefs" been made without Hong Kong being free to offer advice? (Para. 21)7
When has Hong Kong been denied access to the Board of Trade On Civil Aviation negotiations? (Para.21)
When has the Hong Kong adviser been excluded from "internal mestings"? (Para.21).
ADDITIONAL MK COMMENT
He is naturally heard within the UK delega- tion by the leader. The idea of set"rules of procedure" for a small delegation in the fast-moving circumstances of negotiations seems unnecessary and impracticably rigid and cumbersome. When is it alleged he has not been heard?
The consultations) messages exchanged and discussions on the UK side preceding end during talks are a wider continuing process of formulating objectives and corduct in the discussions than some rigid "brief" doou- ment. The briefs compiled are primarily factual, analytical, and of issues in historical depth.
It may at times be desirable for the Commonwealth Office role to be brought out, but this does not deny access to the Board of Trade.
6.
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