TNAG-0862-FCO40-1072-Involvement-of-Hong-Kong-in-air-services-agreements-1979 — Page 48

CON. IDENTIAL

5. ON AID TO VIETNAM, RAJARATNAM SAID THAT THE BASIC PRINCIPL SHOULD BE TO WITHHOLD IT, AND TO MAKE THIS CLEAR IN PUBLIC. HOWEVER, THIS GENERAL POLICY. SHOULD BE QUALIFIED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PREVENT THE VIETNAMESE LOSING THEIR HEADS AND LASHING OUT. ANY EVIDENCE OF MAJOR FOOD SHORTAGES SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED SINCE THIS WOULD CREATE SYMPATHY FOR THE VIETNAMESE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. IT WAS BETTER TO BE FLEXIBLE AND TO SAY TO THE VIETNAMESE THAT IF THEY COULD MAKE ANY SPECIAL CASES FOR HUMANI 71ARIAN AID THESE WOULD BE CONSIDERED AD HOC WHILE THE BASIC PUBLIC POSTURE OF GIVING NO AID SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

5. CORTAZZI THEN OUTLINED BRITISH POLICY OF POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR ASEAN. WE HAD PROMOTED THE EEC/ASEAN DIALOGUE AND HAD SOUGHT CLOSE LIAISON PRIOR TO AND DURING THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON KAMPUCHEA, MINISTERIAL EXCHANGES WOULD INCREASE AND WE WERE DEVELOPING OUR ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING PROGRAMMES NOT ONLY IN SINGAPORE BUT IN OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES. WHAT ELSE SHOULD WE BE DOING TO DEMONSTRATE OUR SUPPORT FOR ASEAN?

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THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

8.

RAJARATNAM ALSO URGED THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO GIVE MORE SUBSTANCE TO THE TENTATIVE AGREEMENT AT THE EEC/ASEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING FOR BOTH SIDES TO LIAISE AT THE UN, SO THAT RISKS OF UNNECESSARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPINGS COULD BE MINIMISED.

CORTAZZI AGREED AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT SINGAPORE MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS TRANSITING THROUGH LONDON SHOULD CALL AT THE FCO SO THAT THE DIALOGUE COULD BE DEVELOPED.

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