DSR 11C
firms can explore, without commitment, Chinese intereste
in all these items.
9. The Chinese might try to exploit a naval visit for propoganda purposes, to suggest that it implies some form of informal alliance between China and Britain (and more broadly the West) against the Soviet Union. But careful
briefing of the press in London before the visit, and of the senior officers involved, should ensure that it is
well understood, in Peking and in Moscow, that we view
the visit as a natural part of our bilateral relations, and not directed against any third party.
10. The Chinese have indicated informally that they would
welcome a visit by the First Sea Lord. His visit would
precede that of the Royal Navy, and would (in addition to its more general defence and defence sales content)
provide an opportunity to discuss the group's visit at a high level.
as well would be excessive 11. The chief of General Staff has also indicated interest
in visiting China. This would be excessive. Our defence,
and defence sales, relationships with China do not warrant visits by two Chiefs of Staff in the same year. concentration of visits could reasonably be interpreted in both Peking and Moscow as indicating that we regard military cooperation as the primary element in our relation- ship with China.
Such a
89280 Dd 532113 200M 2/79 S1S
Page 30Page 31
D:
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.