TNAG-0850-FCO40-1060-Future-of-Hong-Kong-New-Territories-leases-1979 — Page 143

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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5.

b)

c)

We know the Chinese are giving our proposal serious consideration and have not dismissed it out of hand. We believe it to be in their interest as much as ours, and in no way to prejudice their position or freedom of action with regard to Hong Kong. But it does involve both time and a major effort on the part of the Chinese to come to see this, considerable courage to recommend it, and a decision at the highest level to authorise it. All this must take time, and if we appear over-anxious or attempt to hustle, it will not help to get the answer we wish.

The position described in a) makes implausible any suggestion that a statement on the leases is urgently required to prevent a drop in confidence.

The counter arguments, for bringing things to an issue fairly soon, are:-

6.

(i) Having proposed a definitive statement in

October there is a lot to be said for sticking to it and not allowing the opportunity to extract acquiescence from the Chinese to pass.

(ii) The argument in (i) has particular force at

this time when the present leadership and political and economic climate, and the prospect of Hua Guofeng's visit to the U K, all make for such a favourable conjuncture, and produce as good an opportunity to get the Chinese to acquiesce in this perfectly reasonable proposition as we are ever likely to have.

These arguments are finely balanced but I think that (i) and (ii) are some what the weaker because we could extract ourselves from the October 10 deadline with some plausibility if we wished (see para 7 (d) below), but also because in addition to Hua Guofeng's visit, there will no doubt be other occasions within the next year at which the subject could be raised at a high level and after the Chinese have had longer to get used to the idea. Moreover it will be surprising if the present leadership and emphasis on economic development which so favours the present status in Hong Kong, and maintenance of confidence there, did not continue for at least another year.

7. My conclusions are:

a) We should not go ahead with the statement in the absence of any Chinese comment on Cradock's approach of 5 July.

b)

We should take no steps to nudge a comment out of the Chinese meanwhile, but

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/ c)

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