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ment without an undertaking that HMG would reinforce the garrison
when necessary, and unless they had been assured that there would
be a battalion in the area, available at all times for immediate
reinforcement. He found it difficult to understand why the whole
of the Gurkha Battalion in Brunei could not be sent to Hong Kong
at once. Gurkhas were of much greater value because they were
already acclimatised and familiar with Hong Kong. If the Sultan
of Brunei was worried, he could be assured that they would, if
required, be returned to Brunei within 24 hours. He was not
enthusiastic about MOD plans for a roulement every 2 months. A
new battalion needed at least 3 weeks to acclimatise and become
effective. MOD's plans would be inefficient and very expensive.
It was agreed that the Governor would put these points to the
Defence Secretary when he saw him that afternoon.
3.
Vietnamese Refugees
Mr Blaker invited the Governor to comment on Washington telegram
No 1521. The Governor said that it would be easier to persuade
the United States Government to take Hong Kong's problems more
seriously in the autumn when there would probably be at least
100,000 Vietnamese refugees there. He would be paying a further
visit to the United States in the autumn. His main objective
during his visit the following week would be to establish contacts
in the administration and in the White House. But he also hoped
to persuade the Americans to increase Hong Kong's share of their
monthly quota of 7,000 Indo-Chinese refugees. Mr Blaker asked
whether Hong Kong could tolerate such large numbers. The Governor
said that Hong Kong had no choice. Unlike other territories in
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