the decisions are taken by those who are not only best placed to judge but who also carry the immediate constitutional responsibility for public order. If an elected Minister, say of Home Affairs or of Justice, carries responsibility under a constitution, he and his government could reasonably complain if his voice in the crucial decision were not to be given due weight. If the power of decision in such a matter were to be removed in effect to the government in London, then it would no longer be possible to hold the Governor or
His Ministers responsible for what might follow. It would amount to an amendment to the constitutional relationship between Whitehall and dependencies and this would of course require proper consultation between the metropolitan and territorial governments before being given effect. To change the practice without reasonable opportunity for local ministerial views to be heard might engender serious strains
on the working of the sensitive and often difficult constitutional relationship between Governor and Ministers in which cooperation by
elected Ministers is vital.
6. Subject to reasonable prior consultation it would clearly be
legitimate for the UK Government either to vary the Creech-Jones doctrine or to legislate by Act of Parliament so as to abolish the death penalty in dependent territories. It the latter course were followed the need for a local committee to advise the Governor would fall away and one powerful cause of local Ministers declining to cooperate with the Governor in the operation of the machinery would disappear. If however the Creech-Jones doctrine were to be varied so as to permit the Secretary of State to decide each case in his own judgment and if the intention were to use this power in effect to abolish the death penalty, then the consequences on the Governor's relations with his local advisers would need to be considered. It would be important to deal openly with local Ministers if the position and credit of the Governor were not to be
undermined.
7.
The suggestion has been made that in order to avoid possible embarrassment to British Ministers Governors should 'pend' their
decisions in the direction of commutation irrespective of local considerations or of the merits of the case. This suggestion seems neither constitutionally proper nor administratively wise.
It introduces an element of insincerity into the Governor's dealings with his advisers and seeks to exert extraneous influence upon his proper discharge of the burden of responsibility which constitutionally
/is placed
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