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bears some responsibility, though probably less than Hua, for the imprudent plans of 1978. Nevertheless he remains the most powerful figure and the impetus for modernisation and reform continues to come mainly from him. He has been aided by two main groups, a clutch of veteran administrators headed by Chen Yun, the architect of China's soundly based growth in the early 50s (who is probably responsible for the new realism in economic policies) and a team of slightly younger men strategically positioned in the government and Party apparatus. The tide is continuing to run their way. In fact the latest indications are of a strong counter-attack against the surviving Leftists in the leadership, who underwent criticism at the December plenum but survived to make trouble in the spring.
18.
This raises again the question of the position of Hua Guofeng. He is far from a cypher. He is able to use his position as incumbent of the top Party and government posts to project himself; indeed during the NPC Deng was virtually invisible. Hua may still have lingering doubts about certain of the more "revisionist" aspects of the policies (Deng's) which he now publicly espouses. Equally Deng may resent appearing to play second fiddle. There are good reasons why they should thoroughly dislike each other and as a beneficiary of the Cultural Revolution Hua is vulnerable. But both seem tolerably reconciled to working together in the interests of China's modernisation.
19.
There will continue to be contradictions within the leadership and the leadership will continue to be faced by appalling problems. The immensity of their targets and the immensity and backwardness of the country are sufficient in themselves to explain this. How to liberate thought and still retain some reverence for Mao? How to engage the enthusiasms of the young while maintaining order and Party control? How to
/convince
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10.
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