(e)
MOIN LIV
that we were suggesting sites with long distance monitoring capability would probably prompt the Russians to ask for equal treatment. The establishment of NSS in Commonwealth territory would be difficult to reconcile with the concept of the SVA to provide for additional means of monitoring the CTB compliance of the 3 parties to it, including by National Seismic Stations. There could be difficulties from the US Departments of Energy and Defence and from Congress if the separate purpose of the SVA were to be attenuated. It thus seems that this option would be most advantageous if combined with (c) above; withdrawal of our bid to be a party to the SVA. Ministers have already decided that it is in British interests to be a party to the SVA and the Americans and Russians have agreed in principle. Being a party will give us access to US data on Soviet compliance with a CTB and enable us to participate in the Joint Consultative Committee set up by the SVA, which is likely to play a key role including in discussing what should happen after a 3 year treaty. Withdrawal of our bid to be a party to the SVA would deprive us of those advantages. It would greatly reduce British influence in the negotiations generally and
standing deprive us of ground on some of the most
important/lved It would also reduce our
standing as a nuclear weapon state with a leading role in disarmament. It might, however, prove necessary to examine this further as a possible ultimate resort, if provision of 10 NSS on UK territory proved impossible and other alternatives had been decisively rejected by our negotiating partners.
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
15.
The question of the sharing of the costs of the SVA between the parties to it has not been discussed in the negotiations. The outcome could have a significant effect on the financial implications for the UK of the various options for NSS examined above. Possible approaches are:
Dd 427265 250M 5/77 905275
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.