DSK FC
and proposed that all NSS' should be operating with the improved equipment within 2 years from the treaty's entry into force. On 11 October 1978, the US presented revised proposals designed for a 3 year treaty: a network of 10 single borehole NSS in the Soviet Union, 3 of them at existing seismic installations, "deferring the question of a larger network with arrays for consideration in the context of any replacement treaty and verification agreement". NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS
4.
On 27 November 1978 the Russians gave a partial response to these American proposals. They asserted that no NSS were necessary for verification of a 3 year treaty but that, if the US and UK continued to insist, they would accept 10 NSS in the Soviet Union on the basis of "equal obligations", i.e. provided that the US and the UK each. accepted 10 NSS in their territories. The Russians specified locations for these but refused to be drawn on the technical characteristics of NSS (which will govern their performance) or the timescale for installation. said that the first of these important points would depend on whether it was agreed that the treaty could in principle be extended after 3 years. They would make counter- proposals for the locations of NSS in the Soviet Union when the US and UK were ready to respond to the new Soviet proposal for NSS on their territories.
5.
They
On 14 December the US accepted as "appropriate" the general locations proposed by the Soviet Union for 10 NSS in the USA. The UK, in a preliminary response, raised certain queries but made clear that it was willing to give the Soviet proposals the most careful and full consideration. THE ROLE OF NSS
A:
6.
TECHNICAL
The scope for Soviet cheating is already limited by the existence of the teleseismic network deployed by the US as part of their Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS). Improvements in hand are deisfed to enable AEDS to distinguish underground nuclear explosions from earthquakes at equivalent yield levels above 1 to 10 kilotons depending, in the case of explosions, on the properties of the rock surrounding the nuclear device. However teleseismic monitoring can detect seismic events at yields one-third as great as this, without being able to distinguish between earthquakes and nuclear explosions. A network of 10 single borehole NSS in the Soviet Union would remove this
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