TNAG-0832-FCO40-1040-Future-of-the-Dependent-Territories-1979 — Page 26

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GISTRY NO 41

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CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

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COLONIAL LEFTOVER AND A CONST ITUT IONAL OVERDRA FT

SUMMARY

B.

The classic British policy of decolonisation has run its course except in a few cases wher e independence is unwanted or unattainable. Belize qualifies for independence but what attitude should we adopt if it is forced by external circumstances to remain a dependency? (Paragraphs 1 - 2.)

2

Belize for historical reasons has been allowed to enact its on constitution. Ministers inade. proposals last year for devolution of further powers from Governor to Ministers. Need to examine our longer term attitude to such demands. (Paragraphs 3 · 4.)

3.

Dangers of delegating too much authority before independence is in sight. Even if present Ministers are trustworthy things could change in the future. The present domestic calm may not continue indefinitely. Fowers once formally devolved cannot be clawed back without a constitutional crisis. The British Govern- ment hus a basic responsibility for the proper management of the country's affairs. (Paragraphs 5 - 7.)

4.

To give the P ublic Service Commission executive powers could lead to pressure for greater ministerial control over the public service. In practice Ministers already enjoy a degree of responsibility for the terms and conditions of the civil service going substantially beyond the letter of the Constitution. (Paragraphs 8 9.)

5. In 1971 a request for power over the police to be entrusted to a Minister was refused because ultimate responsibility rested with HMG in London and with the Army. It had been found in the Bahamas that such entrustment left the loyalty of the police to the Governor in doubt. Governors were authorised to resist such proposals. (Paragraphs 10 - 11.)

6.

Although the Belize Constitution envisages the Commissioner of Police receiving policy guidance from the Governor in practice Ministers have been given an increasing say in such matters. The problem now is to restrain them from overstepping the mark. (Paragraph 12.)

7. Previous Governors have sought to keep pace with legitimate aspirations for progress by flexible interpretation of the Con- stitution; but this process of allowing an overdraft on constitutional account has gone about as far as it can safely go. (Paragraph 13.)

8. Mr Price's reservations about British intentions. Failure to achieve independence, refusal of constitutional advance and restriction of ministerial authority over the police may lead to frustration and protest. The public are more complacent and would not be much interested in a showdown over such demands; but this could change. (Paragraphs 14 - 15.)

9. The lifting of the "siege" is not in sight. able to maintain our ability to withstand it.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

We must be