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40(2)
encouraging the moderate members of the Force to challenge their leadership of the JPOA. Such a tactic might, however, backfire and produce an emotional atmosphere which would benefit the extremists. On balance we decided that no dramatic, overt, action of this sort should be taken. (It might also have proved very difficult to have any of the cases ready in
prove time. Instead we would allow the elections to take their course in the hope that as many as possible of the more sensible members of the Force would take part and would produce a leadership which, if not exactly moderate, might not be composed entirely of those who had pushed for the formation of the Association simply to serve their own ends.
4.
These
In the meantime ve vill not be idle. We will try to encourage a responsible Association by using the press. efforts will take two forms. The first is an attempt to discourage publicity for the disruptive and critical activities of the Preparatory Committee. The second is a drive to encourage the press and prominent individuals to call for an Association which is genuinely concerned with the welfare of the Force and the public and to criticise those who are in it to feather their own nests. This second objective is already having some success in the reporting of the Governor's speech to the Chamber of Commerce on 27 January and as a result of a confidential briefing he gave to selected editors the same day.
The longer term problem is what to do after the elections. It seems highly likely that we shall at some time be forced into a confrontation with the JPOA. It is important that this should be on grounds of our own rather than their choosing. It must also be on an issue where the government and not the dissidents can be assured of widespread support, both from the public and within the Force itself.
5.
The ground we would like to choose is any attempt by the Association to interfere in the course of justice or of the disciplinary procedures of the Force, preferably the former. Such a situation may occur as a result of the Yaumatei case. By the time the elections are behind us, the Attorney General should be able to decide about how many of those accused in the case can be prosecuted. When that happens, the JPOA will have two choices. On the one hand they could do nothing. If so, it will have been demonstrated publicly that they are not an effective "protection society": the government will then have shown that it remains firmly in control and the Association will have lost face. Alternatively, the JPOA may try to create trouble in an attempt to force the government to back down on the prosecutions. Should that happen, we believe we would have the vast majority of the public, as well as a substantial number of the Force, on our side in dealing with those who are attempting to be a law unto themselves.
/contd......
SECRET
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