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misconduct, which would normally contain a wilful element, and action in relation to impompetence which would normally be a reflection of an officer's ability and effort. Incompetence is often dealt with in departments by the side-ways postings of officers into positions where they have the least responsibility and can therefore do least damage. The point does arise, however, where extreme incompetence comes very close to misconduct as in the case envisaged by the definition of supervisory accountability (Fara. 1.6); i.e. failure to recognise serious, repeated and widespread irregularities or malpractices within an officer's area of responsibility. In that event, discipline is regarded as necessary. It is at this point that the distinction is blurred. The feeling amongst very senior Government officers was that the Government has always been too kind in disciplinary matters and lacks the degree of ruthlessness civil servants invariably believe exists in the private sector. It was widely thought that too much protection is afforded to the civil servant as regards his employment and he has to be thoroughly incompetent before any action is taken.
It was also recognised, however, that it is difficult for Government to strike the balance between providing conditions of employment and tenure of service necessary to achieve continuity of public service and yet retain some flexibility.
3.38 Many officers saw the present disciplinary system, other than for minor
staff, as cumbersome and long-winded. They admit to the tendency to use it as a last resort, largely because they are reluctant to apply the effort to go through with what they described as the complex and time-consuming procedures. Several officers observed that the process takes so long for a decision to be made that any salutory effect on an officer's colleagues within a department is negated. On the other hand,
On the other hand, it is widely thought that the checks and balances built into the present semi-judicial process for a disciplinary enquiry should not be weakened, as they constitute safe-guards for the individual and ensure fair treatment. Officers see a need for speeding up the process, but not necessarily by cutting out any of the present safeguards.
3.39 Several officers at middle management levels observed that, in practice,
the disciplinary system for minor staff works simply, effectively and relatively quickly, through the powers delegated to Heads of Departments and below. It is regarded by some senior officers as ironic that the disciplining of more senior staff cannot work equally effectively. In the language of one senior officer, the "fuss and bother" of disciplining more senior staff is largely responsible for the rarity of such action. It is noted, however, that recently the Commissioners of Police, Prisons, and Customs & Excise have been given additional powers within their respective Ordinances to discipline departmental staff.
3.40 One suggestion offered during discussions was that Heads of Departments
might be far more disposed to take formal disciplinary action if they could be given advice and assistance in these complex procedures.
It was thought that a small unit of officers might be created in the Secretariat which could go out to departments to help in the formulation of the necessary evidence, documents, etc. and advise departmental staff on the way a disciplinary enquiry is conducted.
3.41 To summarise, there is a widespread feeling that within Government there
is an overall tendency to "soft-pedal" in terms of applying discipline to misconduct and in taking the measures necessary to weed out incompetent officers. This feeling strengthens the attitude held by many officers towards employment with Government it is an "iron rice bowl".
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