li
^
-6-
12.
STR said that he did not think that HK
really appreciated the political heat. However he thought that the US had always acted responsibly and he hoped that this was recognised by HK. He personaly did not know much about textiles and he did not want to know. He did know America, he did
know the President. He did know how to move things
in times of stress. These were his strengths. had given up lying 25 years ago. That was his strength also. What he had said to HK was the truth. He really hoped to get early responses from HK. If the response was negative, he would under- stand but whatever the response it was in the interest of both sides that it should be made quickly.
13.
He
DTIC said that he could not at that time say yes or no. What he could say was that he accepted the obligation to consider any revisions which the US wished to propose.
Returning to his earlier remarks he meant that if the USA did certain things it would appear to others that it was following in the footsteps of the EEC. He accepted fully that this was not what the STR want ed to do; he spoke only of how it would appear to them.
14.
ST? expressed his thanks to DT IC and said that his office were always open. The President wanted the discussion with HK begun as soon as possible and all avenues explored to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution.
15%
The STR then left the meeting. Ambassador
Smith took up the word.
16..
Smith said there was a real risk that
Hollings would reintroduce his bill, and the
Administration had no idea whether it could forest:11 this. The US could not take from HK, Korea, Taiwan and Japan in 1979 what it had taken in 197
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