TNAG-0757-FCO40-961-Strength-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 40

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ANNEX A to

DF 17/78(C)(Preliminary D (Continued)

..

57. While some Priority Two Commitments offer RAF Units

the opportunity to carry out essentially the same task as they

would in war, albeit in different circumstances and

surroundings, others result in a progressive

erosion of the operational status of the unit and personnel

concerned and therefore their capability for their Priority One

(NATO) task. In the worst instances, where the units concerned

are subject to TACEVAL by international teams, there is a

significant risk that our credibility in NATO will be eroded

because units can no longer maintain their hitherto high ratings.

NATO Reactions

58.

The need to employ NATO forces for additional Priority Two

Commitments, even if these are encountered on the scale

suggested earlier in this paper, is considered unlikely to change

the prevailing attitude within NATO's Military Structure

(See para 38). Political reactions, particularly from those

smaller countries to whom the UK has a reinforcement commitment,

are more difficult to forecast.

involve the UK Delegation to NATO as early as possible in the

planning process for each addtiional commitment, in order that

potential political damage be minimised by timely briefing

It would he important to

and reassurance by the UK Delegate.

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