TNAG-0757-FCO40-961-Strength-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 4

CODE 18.17

Mr Beattie, UND Mr Smith, SEAD Mr Hime, SWPD

Mr Tatham, MED

Mr Powell, NENAD

Mr Masefield, FED +

Mr Coltman, SED Mr Holloway, SAD Mr Sindall, SAmD

Mr Yarnold, NAD

Mr Joy, M&CD

Mr Rosling, EAD

Mr Varcoe, CSAD

Mr Mackilligan, WAD

Mr Nason, PTD

Miss Stoddart, WIAD

Mr Quantrill, KH&GD

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Miss Spencer, Rhodesia Dept Mr Figgis, Defence Dept

Mr Cornish Planning Staff

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Mr Llewellyn-Smith EESD Mr Furness, WED

Mr Free-Gore, RID

Mr Parkinson, CEU

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UK CAPABILITY TO, FULFILL PRIORITY TWO COMMITMENTS

1.

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The Defence Policy Staff of the Ministry of Defence, who have achieved an unusually high output of papers over the past few months, have now invited our comments on the attached draft Chiefs of Staff Paper on the UK's ability to meet Category Two commitments.

2. Category Two includes all military activities not directly connected with our contribution to NATO which has, since the Defence Review of 1974, been the over- riding charge on resources available for defence. In particular it covers military aid to the Dependent Territories, contributions to UN Forces, evacuation of British nationals and activities in support of foreign policy objectives. The doctrinal position has hitherto been that Category Two activities can only be undertaken at the expense of NATO commitments which have near absolute priority. (Northern Ireland, as part of the UK home base, enjoys the same priority as NATO and falls outside the scope of this Paper.)

3. The Paper argues that since 1974 the armed forces have in fact found it possible to undertake many Category Two commitments without undue difficulty. It further argues that the reasons for this are fortuitous. In particular we have never been faced with more than one crisis requiring forces at a time. If we had we would have been seriously embarrassed. The Paper also points out that none of the Category Two operations undertaken by our forces since 1974 has been on the scale of the Cyprus reinforcement, which happened before the defence cuts took effect.

4.

The Paper goes on to say that our armed forces are likely to be faced with continuing requests for Category Two deployments to which Ministers will want them to respond positively. We cannot rely on crises continuing to occur conveniently one at a time. The Defence Policy Staff therefore suggest that there should be some modest improvements in the air transport force, in war reserve stocks and in logistic support. These are the areas where in accordance with Ministers' declared intention of cutting "the tail not the teeth", successive cuts have hit hardest. If improvements on the proposed lines were made, the Paper suggests that MOD should abandon its existing policy of approaching every proposal for a Category Two commitment on the basis that resources are not available to meet it, or can only be committed at the expense of Category One tasks. It also proposes that onee MOD has committed itself to a Category Two operation, it should be regarded as Category One for as long as it lasts.

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