TNAG-0757-FCO40-961-Strength-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 24

SECRET

ANNEX A te

DP 17/78(C)(Preliminary Deeft)

(Continued)

entire UNFICYP force, limited logistic support for UNIFIL from

Cyprus, and air transport for the Fijian contingent to UNIFIL.

The Chiefs of Staff have agreed7 (15) that in anticipation of

an increased requirement for peacekeeping operations and in lieu

of former UK offers, HMG should offer to provide for any future

operation (in addition to present support for UNFICYP and UNIFIL):

(a) An infantry battalion group for up to 6 months at

7 days notice to deploy;

(b) The initial airlift of this force to its deployment

area;

(c) Assistance with sea-borne support wherever possible,

A longer deployment or logistic support for a larger force or for

a deployment in excess of six months, could only be provided

by drawing on BAOR (Priority One) resources. Successive cuts in

the support area have left the Army with insufficient signals

and logistics resources to support teeth arm units provided

by other nations. For example, to satisfy a UN request for signals

support in Namibia would have meant that Northern Ireland, Belize

or Hong Kong could not be reinforced, signals elements could not be

included in protected evacuations, and within six months an

armoured division in BAOR would have become non-operational. Air

transport support for the UK force, once deployed, would be

impossible without adjustment of the shape, size and employment

of the Air Transport Force.

Note:

15. DP 13/78 (Final) (To be issued)

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