TNAG-0757-FCO40-961-Strength-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 234

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HEADQUARTERS BRITISH FORCES HONG KONG

BRITISH FORCES POST OFFICE 1

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Reference: A MO2/246/671 dated 6 April 1977.

1.

You will recall that in his Tour Report at Reference A, Director of Military Operations commented on the use of the shotgun by the Royal Hong Kong Police (RHKP) for Internal Security (IS) operations. The purpose of this letter is to seek your agreement to the issue of shotguns to the Army in Hong Kong for IS operations. Our case is founded on the principle of applying minimum force in parallel with the RHKP.

2.

RHKP Use of Firearms. In the Hong Kong disturbances of 1956, 1966 and 1967, KHKP riot platoons used firearms to prevent their being overrun by violent crowds. In addition to ball ammunition they used Greener (shot) guns.

Each riot platoon is now equipped with 4 Remington 870 shotguns and Express No 2 shot cartridges containing 102 pellets of birdshot. When special IS weapons such as CS gas and baton rounds are ineffective, shotguns are used to fire a volley to check a crowd which would otherwise overrun the platoon. The shotgun and birdshot cartridges used in this way are very effective and do not cause fatal casualties. This concept is understood by the Chinese who accept that the shotgun represents the minimum application of force by firearms.

3.

Army Requirement. The primary role of the Army is to support the PHKP in an IS situation. In the event of a serious disturbance, Police and Army riot platoons would deploy in parallel. In circumstances where special IS weapons are ineffective and it becomes essential to use firearms to prevent riot platoons being overrun, the RHKP would initially engage with the shotgun. The Army however would be obliged to use 7.52 ball which will almost certainly cause fatal injuries In such circumstances, the degree of force used by the Army will compare most unfavourably with that used by the RHKP. It will not be seen as either reasonable in the

It circumstances nor the minimum force available to the Security Forces. is essential for the Army to avoid such invidious comparisons and to conform to the local understanding that a shotgun provides a lesser degree of force than a rifle and effectively bridges the gap between special IS weapons and ball ammunition.

1 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL