TNAG-0757-FCO40-961-Strength-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 217

Σ

DS6/46/66/1

SENCRETE

D of DP(C)

Copy to: AUS(D Staff)

AUS(GS)

BGS (MO)*

FCO (Hong Kong Dept)*

HONG KONG

DDASD*

COSSEC

Mr

100

Thongs 22614 - here we the background papes to the outward Telegram we have alread, seen.

HKK 062/1.

DECK OFFICES

INDEX

PA

9978

NOTR. 26/ir

Y

Reference: A. CBFHK KDO 140100Z April (copy attached for addressees

marked*).

You asked for our comments on a draft reply to Reference A; the draft suggested that CBFHK and his staff might participate in the Hong Kong Government study on the potential requirement for an additional Gurkha battalion to be stationed in Hong Kong if and when a battalion was no longer available in Brunei to provide immediate reinforcement, but that this participation should stop short of the consideration of financial and political considerations, which should be reserved to London.

2. I have discussed this with AUS(GS) who feels strongly that it would not be advisable to take such a line. The existing force levels, and our obligation to reinforce Hong Kong, were agreed by Ministers and, provided we achieve a satisfactory outcome to the Brunei negotiations, it is difficult to see how the situation in Hong Kong will have changed so as to justify a study of increased force levels. Thus, at least until the Brunei negotiations are concluded, it is felt that CBFHK and his staff should not participate in any study on revised force levels in Hong Kong, unless there are new Hong Kong security factors of which we are not aware. If there are such factors, it is suggested that it should be for the Governor to raise the matter the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and if it is then considered that there are grounds for a review of force levels and/or reinforcement plans we would expect our Ministers to be asked to authorise CBFHK to take part in local discussions.

3. We have spoken to FCO (Hong Kong Dept) who share our reservations. In particular, they consider that it would be premature to embark on such a study in advance of the Anglo-Brunei negotiations, and they also feel that any proposal to increase the size of the Hong Kong garrison would be particularly sensitive.

4. You may feel that a temporising reply to Reference A, pointing out that both MOD and FCO feel that there is no need for such a study, at least until we know the results of the Brunei negotiations, would suffice. A suggested draft is attached.

1.

*

SECRET

15.