CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
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negotiated, that the "stationed force should consist of 5 units", but that, in the light of then-current threat, "while a Gurkha battalion is available in Brunei a stationed force in Hong Kong of 43 units would be acceptable". It is, however, clear that at that time it was estimated that it might take up to 3 weeks for a complete reinforcement battalion to arrive from the UK. The situation is now very different. Although a Gurkha battalion in Brunei can clearly arrive in Hong Kong more quickly than any reinforcement battalion from UK, two battalions from UK could now be in Hong Kong within 7 days, using the west-about route (for which clearance has now been obtained). Unless there are any new factors in the Hong Kong security situation of which we are not aware (and we are, of course, aware of the recent problems within the RHK Police) which materially reduce the amount of warning of impending difficulty which the Governor expects to have, this greatly improved capability to reinforce from the UK might be argued to fulfil his requirement. Although not strictly relevant to the DOP paper, we would of course continue to assume that a UK-based Gurkha battalion would be an automatic choice to form part of any emergency reinforcement of Hong Kong if it were not already inextricably committed elsewhere.
4. It is very much a first draft on what is a complex and difficult subject and I would welcome comments on general content and in detail; and in particular on those sections in square brackets. I would envisage the paper being circulated, once agreed, for Director-level comment; then put to VCGS both for ECAB/AB clearance and, through COSSEC, for clearance by the Chiefs, and finally to go from CDS to S of S and from him to DOP.
5.
This will all clearly take time, which is not unlimited, and I would therefore welcome your comments and contributions by 4 May 1978.
26th April 1978
2.
Mutares.
W AT AVES
Pcpl DS 6
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.