TNAG-0757-FCO40-961-Strength-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 176

110

D/DS6/16/49

DPS (C) D Ops(Row)

COSSEC

MO 2

ASD 2

DS 1

DS 7

DS 11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HKK 062/1

1 1 MAY 1978

DECK OFFICER INDEX

M

PA

RS. 5

бы

45. 51

TRY

¡Action Taken

GF 3

Copy to:

FCO, South Asian Dept

South East Asia Dept Hong Kong Dept

Defence Dept

FUTURE OF THE BRIGADE OF GURKHAS : DRAFT DOP PAPER

Reference:

A.

D/DS6/16/49 dated 26 April 1978.

1. I am very grateful for the comments, in writing or by telephone, on my first draft attached to the Reference.

2.

We remain of the opinion that, because we are seeking to vary a decision taken in the 1974 Defence Review, the paper we have in mind will need to be referred to the DOPC. However we accept that a shorter paper would be more suitable for DOP consumption.

3. We have also gathered from FCO that they now believe that much the most likely result of the Brunei talks due to be held in London next month is an adjournment, followed by further rounds of negotiations at a later date.

4. In these circumstances, we have recast the paper to aim it simply at obtaining approval for the retention of a 5-battalion Brigade of Gurkhas until 12 months after the date at which the Brunei commitment lapses, whenever thint may be.

This has resulted in a very much more concise paper.

5. We have given further thought to the suggestion that the paper should include a reference to the possibility that the Government of Hong Kong will make a bid for the fifth battalion to be stationed in Hong Kong when the Prunei commitment lapses. It is now well understood, in both London and Hong Kong, that it is for the Governor to make his case to the FCO on this, and that HOD (and, for that matter, CBFHK) will in the meantime take no action in connection. with participating in a Hong Kong Govt study on such a possibility. In these circumstances, and because the proposals for the retention of the fifth battalion made in the paper would, if approved, provide adequate opportunity for whint would amount to a reopening of the Hong Kong DCA, before any irreversible action on the Gurkhas were taken, we feel that no reference should be made to thig possibility either in the paper or in any covering minute to MOD Ministern.

CONERENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL