TNAG-0757-FCO40-961-Strength-of-UK-armed-forces-stationed-in-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 17

11.

13. S

Aombina cintas the Falltier JAN-

Live Fail Bend Tetond Dependencies and the surIVE

Bertanke: Plunes. Negotiations lyne reached a virtual figuren, The Minelable for discussions as official level has not been ndbered to. KMG is concerned over Argentine action in Southe Thule and lack of progress in economic co-operation and is reinct- cat to embark on further take on Sovareigaty unless there is hopp of progress, The wilitary threat to the Islands is unlikely to change while Argentina remotas pro-nccupied with ber Boegle

Channel dispute with Chile, while the Argentines believe that they car rogain sovereignty by negotiation, and while they are uncertain over the possibility of UK military reaction to seizure of the Islanão; but how long the present bajauce will continue is un- predictable. Without a politics' getuiemunt, or further moves towards can, the military throat vill increase. The cent of tim suaji Falklands Islands detachment (37 Servicemen) is minimal, but the accompanying requirement for the Ice Patrol Ship in reder to maintain the Islandero' confidence and to remind the Argentines of BM's continuing commitment to the Islands, together with covert RN deploymentssuch as were made in 1977 to counter the Argentine threat both to the Islands and to British shipping in the area Lake aspects of this continuing commitment potentially expensive.

12.

Gibraltar. Whereas in 1974, Gibraltar was judged to be of some value to NATO it was then assessed (5) as no longer of great military importance to the UK. Thereafter, however, while Gibrantur re-

Note:

5.

OPD (74)23

THIS IS A COPY THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT ! UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE

PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958