225
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A
meta keng keddmades da inkarnikavas
SECRET
HKK OSI/1.
RECEIVE
4 MAY 1978
DACK OFFICER
INDEX
NO. 51
RES
"RY
Actor Taken
15t
PA
i7
F
FM PEKING
9473382
SECRET
why
TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 264 OF
MAY 1978
Seefia
INFO HONG KONG (FOR GOVERNOR AND POLAD), TOKYO, MODUK (DS1), SECURITY SERVICE.
YOUR TEL 349 TO HONG KONG: COUNTER TERRORISM.
1. THE CHINESE REACTION WOULD OF COURSE DEPEND TO SOME EXTENT
ON THE STATE OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE AT THE TIME ON HOW WE PRESENT THE MATTER TO THEM OR, IF WE DO NOT INFORM THEM, THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THEY BECAME AWARE.
HOWEVER,
I CANNOT SEE THEM BEING PLEASED AT THE PROSPECT AND THEY MAY
WELL OBJECT. THERE IS NO IDENTIFIABLE ADVANTAGE TO THEM IN
ACQUIESCING BEFORE OR AFTER THE EVENT, BUT THERE ARE SURELY CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISKS. ASSUMING AS I THINK
WE MUST THAT WORD OF THE EXERCISE WOULD LEAK OUT, WE CAN BE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD MAKE THE MOST OF IT, AND THAT CHINESE EMBASSIES, AIRCRAFT ETC WOULD BECOME POTENTIAL
TERRORIST TARGETS. I THINK TOO THAT THE CHINESE WOULD HAVE
DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING THAT THE JAPANESE WERE INCAPABLE OF
MAKING SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS IN JAPAN.
P. AS SEEN FROM HERE THEREFORE IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE TO
ARRANGE THIS EXERCISE IN HONG KONG.
DAVIES
FILES
MAED
HREE D
FAD
PUSD
MR MURRAY
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