TNAG-0753-FCO40-957-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 44

Mr Quanti

We incorpizzy попила?

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Mr Cortazzi

19/xi

SECRET

CC

W121

PS/PUS

Sir A Duff

Mr Murray

Mr Samuel

FED)

Mr McLaren (HK&GD)

BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS HONG KONG IN THE 1980S

I have one comment on the draft outline paper (with which I broadly agree) attached to your submission of 9 November. It is that I think we have to be rather careful about what we mean by "very damaging consequences for British interests". It seems to me unlikely that there is a very strong direct British interest in retaining Hong Kong as a Colony. But there is a British responsibility for the welfare of the Colony and for seeking to ensure a future which is in accordance with the wishes and interests of its inhabitants; and since we are the administering power, at least up to 1997, we have a strong interest in avoiding the instability and disruption which would result between now and then from a collapse of confidence in the medium-term viability in Hong Kong. If this is right, we have weighty responsibilities in Hong Kong, the discharge of which creates certain interests. Withdrawal would mean an abandonment of responsibilities which would leave an unacceptably messy situation. But this is not quite the same thing as saying that "withdrawal would almost certainly have very damaging consequences for British interests" - at least by any ordinary definition or quantification of British interests.

10 November 1978

Live

BL Crowe Planning Staff

twr.

Cartage

Mr. Mclaren

It's all a matter of drafting. The

indirect effect

British interests

world-wide if we

B

were freed to withdraw from Hong Kong could

certainly be

very

would be to our

SECRET

The direct damage

damaging.

use

of Hong Kong as

CA..

gateway

our export market in China. (This stands the usual argument its Loud, of course). Olemm

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