TNAG-0753-FCO40-957-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 107

CODE 18-77

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Reference

4.

You could then go on with your Section 3 on the contra- diction between the British wish for social and political progress in Hong Kong and Peking's attachment to the status quo. Part of the answer may lie in the education of critics of slow progress, on the one hand, and patient explanation to Peking that some progress will make Hong Kong more rather than less stable.

5. You could then go on to your Section 4, the Lease, adding an explanation of why Hong Kong and the New Territories are indivisible. One solution might lie in a series of unilateral statements by HMG that there is no problem and that we will stay on in Hong Kong indefinitely because that is in the best interests of all concerned. Some contacts with Peking would no doubt be needed before such statements could be made, but the contacts could be highly informal, and we should not expect a direct Chinese response

The aim of the contacts would be to satisfy ourselves that our line would not in fact be undermined by later statements from Peking. In particular, we should not see ourselves as wishing to negotiate with the Chinese Government: British and Chinese interests more or less coincide and the aim is mainly to save appearances. particular, we should not be considering offering concessions to the Chinese. The problem of official Chinese representation in Hong Kong should be considered on its own merits.

In

6. Clearly all these arguments will need to be spelt out at much greater length when you come to write your paper in full. The skeleton stage is, however, an important one, and I hope that you will be able to take account of these comments.

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21 August 1978

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J E Cornish

Planning Staff