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HONGKONG
595
continue as long as does not present an alternative model or a political threat: Britain offers neither of these, whereas the Hong- kong population, if it becomes assertive, could.
V
My argument at this point can be easily summarized: The pre- sent status quo is likely to be wanted by all parties to continue for + some considerable time. If at any time the Chinese call a halt, then the process of reintegration will inexorably begin. If they do not call a halt, then the present development of Hongkong will continue. But supposing that the Chinese preference for continuing the status quo continues past 1997? This is the fascinating ques- tion which I will devote the rest of this question to discussing, and it is not at all fanciful given the present line taken by Chinese officials that modernization of the People's Republic (for which there is a 25-year plan not yet inaugurated) must take precedence, over solving the Hongkong question with Britain.
To put this another way, what happens if the arrival of the 1997 deadline introduces a legalistic inflexibility into a situation. which all parties still by then wish, to preserve as flexible? By no manner of means can it be argued that the 99-year period of lease which was agreed by the Convention of Peking was literally intended by either side. It was certainly not literally intended by the Chinese, who were in no position in 1898 to resist the pressure which the British were then able to exert. On the other hand, the time had already passed when the British felt able to demand further concessions in perpetuity. The compromise was a phrase taken straight out of Victorian property conventions, 99 years meaning "for the foreseeable future," or "for a reasonably long time." Nobody in 1898 literally envisaged the necessity of an actual surrender of the lease 99 years later.
One thing that could happen is the negotiation of an arrange- ment between China and Britain for the returning of sovereignty in the New Territories of Hongkong, but which in some way would allow at least part of the present status quo to continue. There is some precedent to be found for a return of sovereignty of territory conceded by China to Britain, which falls short in fact of total and unconditional return. These are the diplomatic agreements which were reached between the two governments at the end of the 1920s, when the British negotiated to give up their privileges in a number of Chinese concession areas. On February 19, 1927, for example,
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