TNAG-0741-FCO40-945-Relations-between-China-and-Hong-Kong-1978 — Page 34

Mr Masefield. (FED)

CONFIDENT.AD

HKK 220li

1973

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Etal PA

cr 13/4

SK OFFR INDEX

PA

Acton Teken

CHINA: SALE OF HARRIER

1. Mr Yarnold's copy of your minute of 12 April arrived here late yesterday without an immediate label: we have thus had

very

ry little time to consider it, and the draft DOP paper: However I have consulted Miss Bennett, who is the Principal concerned in Mr Norbury' a Department (DS11).

2. You asked for some answer to the Prime Minister's question as to whether the Harrier could be put to significant offensive use against the Soviet Union. There has not been time for MOD to prepare an authoritative assessment of Harrier's capabilities. I can confirm however that it is a fixed wing, vertical short take off and landing (V/STOL) strike fighter which can be used for close support work and reconnaissance. It can carry a variety of guns, bombs and rockets. It is the only fully opera- tional western aircraft of its type and it undoubtedly has an offensive capability.

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I

3. When we reviewed the Chinese defence policy, the broad conclusion was that their main forces were deployed defensively, with a view to deterring a Soviet attack on territory and populations currently under the control of the Chinese Government. In terms of the balance of power between the two countries, the Soviet Union has, as the draft DOP paper makes clear, overwhelming superiority which there is no prospect of the Chinese matching in the foreseeable future, whether or not they acquire Harrier. think, therefore, that we may safely advise the Prime Minister that the Chinese have neither the capability nor the intention of taking the offensive against the Soviet Union. They would use Harrier to improve the defensive capability of their forces facing the Soviet Union. The Harrier would be well suited for this role and indeed comparison with our own use of the aircraft in Germany is inescapable. We may certainly reassure the Prime Minister that we do not believe that the Chinese would put the aircraft to significant offensive use against the Soviet Union. And for the foreseeable future the overall capability of their forces is likely to be such that they also could not mount an offensive against the Soviet Union.

4. As to what the Chinese might want the Harrier for, I think there can be little doubt from what we know of their concern about Soviet intentions, that their primary interest is in the aircraft's particular suitability for defensive work along their border with the Soviet Union. Although, they have not renounced their claim on Taiwan they have not expressed an interest in Sea Harrier. It would in any case take them a long time to bring through deck cruisers into operation. The aircraft would be suitable for tactical operations in support of the North Koreans, but it is unlikely that the Chinese would wish to use this expensive new equipment for this purpose. They want to solve their main defence problem (the Soviet Union). Thus I think it improbable that introduction of Harrier to China would be a trigger for a North Korean attack on the South.

CONFIDELITAT.

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