TNAG-0715-FCO40-911-Future-of-the-Dependent-Territories-4 — Page 41

CONFIDENTIAL

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6. The Anguilla crisis is the one instance of associated statehood having landed us in deep trouble. But frankly I believe that this was more a serious policy error on our part rather than an intrinsic defect of statehood. The West Indies Act had already removed our responsibility in the field of internal security. It had also provided that a state could be divided into separate units only at the request and consent of the government. It would therefore have been open to us to refuse to help Bradshaw with the restoration of law and order in Anguilla. We could have left the Anguillians to wallow in their own mess and answered any criticism with the statement that we were powerless to intervene. The argument that mafia elements were moving in does not seem to me to be a good reason for becoming involved; I cannot imagine that if the mafia were to become involved in the central affairs of a state, as they have 1 believe threatened to do from time to time in Antigua if not elsewhere, we would dream of intervening against the wishes of that government. To have used this as a pretext for treating Anguilla as an external affair, and to have intervened on that basis, has set a very dangerous precedent which will bedevil us until we get rid of all the WIAS.

7. In any case, there is presumably no guarantee that an Anguilla-type crisis could not occur in a dependent territory. The only difference would be that we would then, because of our responsibility for internal security, have no choice but to become involved. Neither would we be able to argue that we had no power to separate the part of the territory concerned. If anything therefore perhaps associated statehood is to be preferred in this context, since it at least gives us the option of keeping out of the dispute. It could perhaps be argued that such problems are less likely to occur in a dependent territory because so long as the British Government are seen to be in overall charge potential secessionists will be less likely to rebel against the central government. This is borne out by the fact that Anguilla, which had never been happy at being part of St Kitts, did not actively rebel until associated state- hood was granted. The suitability in this respect of each territory for associated statehood would have to be assessed, but I suspect that very few, if any, would be a problem. Perhaps some means could be found of indicating in the legislation creating new associated states that an Anguilla-type intervention by Britain would be out of the question.

8. Apart from Anguilla, there has of course always been a risk that a break- down in law and order in an Associated State might lead to a request from the government for British help which we might have difficulty in refusing. In practice this has not been a serious problem. In the two-and-half years I have been dealing with them no such situation has arisen. I understand that prior to that there were one or two occasions when we responded to requests from governments by showing a frigate offshore, but the local security forces have always coped. In practice law-and-order trouble seems no more likely in associated states than in dependent territories, since the type of government action which could lead to a breakdown is probably in most cases already in fields entirely under the control of the local government. And whereas in a dependent territory we would always be obliged to assist, in an associated state it would always be open to us to refuse to do so unless the government first took action to redress any wrongs which had led to the disturbances.

9.

Perhaps the exception to this argument is trouble arising from executions. In a dependent territory we could always reprieve a man under sentence of death. In an Associated State we could not do so (c. at least, we have stated firmly that The Queen's prerogative will not be exe 'cised on the advice of British Ministers).

CONFIDENT TAL

/Thus,