TNAG-0715-FCO40-911-Future-of-the-Dependent-Territories-4 — Page 32

CONFIDENTIAL

hmm... 9 doubt if the 1975 "policy contributed!

things, this is not surprising. It is fair to point out that policy spelt out in the 1975 Despatch has been reasonably successful in that since it was issued there have been 4 grants of independence, but if we can get a clearer statement so much the better. Whatever we want to say needs to be cleared with ODM. My own view is that the key to decolonisation in the Caribbean is more economic than political. I believe our aid programmes in DTS should be

but thought designed with the threefold objectives of:

a) providing the right circumstances to attract

WIAD WWD de Orm!

only if ere

can be sut

what day will be done this

time!

there is not

the remotest possibility but cute would. invade (1

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both local and overseas investment to provide economic growth and viability;

b) to train and make the local manpower resource more efficient and effective, especially the public service;

c) building up local confidence in their power ✓✓ to go it alone.

there is wel more to

it t

just alk torily investo

To this end we need to concentrate on ensuring that individual territorial development plans are imaginative, soundly based and kept under regular review. I think your simplified statement, particularly (b), covers this requirement, but should we not make reference for the need for there to be proper development studies, as was done in the 1975 Despatch? These could be drawn up either by desk officers in London or by Development Divisions and revised periodically.

6. We should somewhere in the Despatch make the point that UK budgetary and capital aid does not necessarily cease on the grant of independence, but, subject to the outcome of the independence negotiations, it may continue thereafter. Perhaps this could be worked into paragraph (b).

7. I suggest amending slightly para (c) of your statement on Aid Policy, by inserting in the fifth line the words "the recurrent costs of" between the words "that" and "unduly". makes the meaning clearer, I think.

This

8. The Defence question is one that does concern some of our dependencies. For example the Cayman Islands, lying close to Cuña, are very concerned about their security and it is one of

the reasons why they wish to retain dependent status. It is accepted we are not going to be able to offer any defence agree- ment to territories which go independent and I think the Despatch should make clear the policy which is spelt out in Mr Munro's minute of 24 October, but at the same time we could stress that the chances of external aggression are minimal. On the other hand, internal security can pose a serious problem for the small newly independent state. The risks of subversion and declining standards of law and order can develop very rapidly after independence and soon threaten the capacity of small colonial- type police forces to contain them. In some cases,

it may noguerlie therefore be necessary for us to accept the commitment of training against thes

-frtbeat, in the love is est internal subversum and

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