TNAG-0715-FCO40-911-Future-of-the-Dependent-Territories-4 — Page 19

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vi.

vii.

initiate a move to full independence. The experience of the Caribbean suggests that this arrangement is liable to leave HMG with international responsibilities but without the power to discharge them effectively, since they cannot intervene in internal affairs. Furthermore, in the case of poor territories, other potential donors of aid would regard an Associated State as the responsibility of Britain and would therefore be inhibited to some extent from giving aid. This solution is considered at length in a separate review of policy on the Future of the Associated States which is now in progress.

Integration with the UK

This solution, which implies positive willingness on the part of HMG to retain the territory indefinitely, is theoretically feasible in the case of very isolated territories with small or no population, and with no realistic prospects of separate independence (eg Pitcairn, Tristan da Cunha or even St Helena). Even in such cases we would have to be careful to ensure that integration would not give rise to embarrassing precedents in relation to territories which might find some such solution attractive, but which HMG would not want to absorb. Thus integration could be extremely expensive in populous territories, and politically impracticable in the case of territories claimed by third countries, eg the Falklands

and Gibraltar.

Continued Dependency

As an alternative to integration, this option might create difficulties in the UN, but need not be insurmountable. Although continued dependence might be acceptable to the majority of the people of a territory we must expect that pressure for progress towards full internal self-government may continue which could eventually pose the problem for HMG of international responsibility without effective control of policy (v. above).

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