TNAG-0715-FCO40-911-Future-of-the-Dependent-Territories-4 — Page 101

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5. We should then go on to demonstrate (as the PAR report did) that it is in the UK interest to reduce the number of our dependent territories to the unavoidable minimum. But given that we have also endorsed the principle of not forcing independence on territories that do not want it, our actions should be limited to creating the conditions which will make independence possible and, hopefully, attractive. We should rule out any attempt to bring pressure to bear on territories that are reluctant to contemplate independence. I suggest that we should avoid referring to this policy as "accelerated decolonisation".

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6. For those territories where independence is considered not to be an option, a number of more or less unrealistic schemes have been floated in the past. But in practice little has been done to explore any of them, because the line of least resistance is simply to let them go on as at present.

I can see no harm in this: but I suggest that our new despatch should present this as a positive decision rather than just let it emerge as what happens anyway through inertia; we should state plainly that, although we are ready to consider other possibilities, for those territories where independence is not an option, we are content to accept the indefinite continuation of the present state of dependency, with all that it implies for both sides. The implications could perhaps then be spelt out: on the one hand these would include our accepting the need to defend the territories' status in the UN, and the need to accept the political risk of our being held answerable for developments in the territories; on the other hand, the territories would have to consciously accept that, if they are to remain dependent, there must be a very definite limit on the powers that can be devolved to them.

7. The despatch might then go on to show how our aid policy towards the territories should fit into the general policy. Again, I hope we could be more decisive than the 1975 paper which did no more than set out tentative options: but this is something that the geographical departments, wearing their ODM hats, will have to decide.

8.

I am not at all sure that it would be necessary for the despatch also to cover such questions as how, having decided that certain territories should remain dependent indefinitely, we should present this policy in the UN, or what should be done about membership of the UN and the Commonwealth and other similar organisations for any small territories that do become independent. These are really no more than consequential that will have to be solved as they arise: they are not of themselves sufficiently important to affect basic decision whether or not the territory should become independent.

9.

Having covered all this ground in the despatch, it should not be necessary to include any policy discussion in the Annex. I also wonder whether, on reflection, there is any point in our

ncluding a review of developments since 1975 (ie the independence of the Seychelles, the Solomons and Tuvalu).

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