TNAG-0714-FCO40-910-Future-of-the-Dependent-Territories-1978 — Page 150

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23

Reference.....

M. Jager (Hory Kory Gent

ком

2

General HKC 225/2

you re Copy & Mi Dale WinD WIAD

in ors

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Mr Wilberforce

:

ого дорож

6/2

A REVIEW OF POLICY ON DECOLONISATION

M. Bentley DIEN

VRECEIVER

-6 FEB 1978

DESK OFFICER

INDEX

R+R.JJ7/2 No

PA

J.J.

20. 51

PEAN RY

Action Taken

ве

You asked for observations on the attached papers from Hong

Kong and General Department.

2.

i

"Defence matters in general for our remaining Dependent Territories" is a wide remit. It seems to me that we have virtually no defence interests in any of the remaining Dependent Territories except for Ascension Island, St Helena, Hong Kong and Gibraltar. As decolonisation is not considered to be an option for either Hong Kong or Gibraltar there would seem little point in discussing our defence and other interests there.

3. Although we have virtually no defence interests in the remaining Dependent Territories we do have responsibilities for both internal security and external defence. We also have responsibilities for the external defence of the West Indian Associated States and Brunei. For the purposes of this review I suggest we should identify on the one hand those territories where our defence responsibilities are an inconvenient burden, and on the other those where MOD can conveniently (or at least without too much turbulence or disruption) meet calls for assistance.

4. Mr Jasper has asked us to focus particularly on the five Caribbean dependencies (Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands). In practical terms, our defence commitments to those territories involve having a frigate appear over the horizon from time to time to blow the whistle on incipient disorder or, as in the case of Bermuda, the rapid despatch of troops from Britain by air to assist the civil power keep law and order (as in the ease of Berauda look year). Expeditions of this sort do not seem particularly unwelcome to MOD. They are usually of brief duration, can be met from existing resources and provide a welcome change from the North German Plain and the Eastern Atlantic. There are no significant route infrasture problems connected with these commitments.

5. Belize is a different matter.

Following the Deferce Review, the Services

do not really have enough men or materials to meet this commitment in addition to their NATO and Northern Ireland responsibilities. Political considerations prevent or slow down the use of resources which MOD do possess eg deploying Gurkhas and Rapiers. Nor is there any time limit to the Belize commitment. The Services would probably welcome the prospect of continuing significant commitments outside th NATO area if the defence budget enabled them to accomplish them without having to explain and apologise at every turn for the resulting holes in NATO.

6. The commitment to the Falkland Islands falls into a different category again. Detailed studies have shown that the Islands could not be defended against a determined Argentine assault, unless we were prepared to deploy a carrier borne task force more or less permanently to the South Atlantic. Our posture is thus a mixture of bluff and negotiation. It seems likely that what the MOD would like is recognition (in the form of extra money) that commitments which were largely ignored in the Defence Review, obstinately refuse to go away.

/7. To sum

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