CONFIDENTIAL
7.
By the evening of Friday, November 4, it became clear that things were badly out of hand and that the Officers' Associations were united behind the men's leaders. This sense of unity and power went to the leaders' heads, they became increasingly militant and threatening in tone and on Friday afternoon the demand for an amnesty, supported by non-law-enforcement, was first publicly made. While official reports indicated that the suggestion was indignantly rejected by the men, it is clear now that it rapidly gained very wide support.
8. By Saturday morning the procedural points had been forgotten in favour of the demand for an amnesty, and non-enforcement of some aspects of the law (eg against hawkers, parking offences) was already taking place. At this point it became clear that assessment of the mood of the force had been very wide of the mark, that for practical purposes it was united in its confrontation
the with its Commissioner, ICAC and the Government
and that unity covered a wide variety of motives - the organisers and indeed most of the force were so intoxicated by the possibilities of police power that a
I therefore very dangerous situation was developing. called a meeting of the Governor's Security Committee including Jack Cater, for 3 p.m., the earliest time by which the Commissioner felt he would have a reliable reading of the situation. I asked the Commissioner to bring with him his deputy, Roy Henry, the two District Commanders of Kowloon and the Island, and the Director of Special Branch, Richardson. This is the meeting referred to in para 10 of my tel 1092.
9.
Though the meeting was calm and matter-of-fact, you can imagine the distress and shock with which one after another the senior officers confessed that they could not rely on their men to carry out orders, if I gave them, to intervene against the ring-leaders. When I asked them whether they would be able to carry out such orders given military support, again each one miserably answered he could not. The Acting CBF pointed out that the army could cordon or enforce curfews or storm a building but it could not be expected to enforce the law or arrest specified persons without the assistance of the Police. Moreover the effect on future service/police relations if we used the army would be very bad.
10. On hearing this analysis, and realising how rapidly the situation was evolving, and how consistently under-
CONFIDENTIAL
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