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such as the few people we allow here from the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. We would not wish to add to their tasks by obliging them to watch more Vietnamese, unless there vere sound reasons for doing so. A slightly different angle on the same problem is that the present unofficial Vietnamese trade representatives here are housed in the Bank of China building. This helps to keep them under control and also, we assume, helps the Chinese to feel that they have their own tabs on them.
As you know, one of the reasons why we are reluctant to agree to any significant increase in the numbers of the unofficial trade office is because they might then move out of the Bank of China building. (Incidentally, I fully agree with the point made from here in earlier correspondence that we cannot explicitly tell the Chinese to keep an eye on the Vietnamese. This would completely undermine our own authority in Hong Kong.)
(3) The Hong Kong Trade angle.
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There have been in the past, and will be in the future, occasions when allowing Vietnamese to come here vill provide a potential benefit for Hong Kong businessmen, Being a commercially orientated place, we should take these opportunities.
(4) The Wider HMG Angle.
3.
We accept that there may be occasions when, in the wider interests of HMG's policy, Hong Kong should do things in its relations with Vietnam which we might otherwise be reluctant to do for purely Hong Kong reasons.
Clearly we must always seek to make a calculation between the negative aspects of (1) and (2) and the positive aspects which might be relevant under (3) and (4). It is not possible to lay down a rigid line about what the balance of advantage might be, since this is bound to vary in each individual case. Furthermore, we realise that international relationships can change and that this could in turn affect our calculations. We would, for instance, be dealing with a completely new game if relations between Peking and Handi suddenly became very friendly or if Vietnam did a Somaliland and threw out the Russians. Seen from here, there seems little immediate prospect of either happening. Meanwhile I think the arguments all point towards continuing our present cautious, but not inflexible, approach.
4.
(a)
Finally, on points of detail in your letter:
The Gold Star Line. I am not aware that the Chinese have ever objected to its activities. I doubt, however, that we should take too much comfort from that; ve should expect their toleration of established practice to be greater than for new developments.
/contd.
CONFIDENTIAL
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