TNAG-0654-FCO40-803-Refugees-from-Vietnam-in-Hong-Kong-1977 — Page 130

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CONFIDENTIAL

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1

Mr Simone, SEAD please sul mold of

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VIETNAM

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1. I had a general discussion of outstanding issues this afternoon with HM Ambassador Hanoi.

2.

Mr White. I went over the various protests we had made about Mr White. While he remained incommunicado this really inhibited all our relations with Vietnam. Mr Tesh said he had it in mind to send a message to Nguyen Co Thach via Miss Luke, before his return, saying roughly this. I advised against action on these lines, that the message would have to be written, which would involve careful drafting, it would be a rigid demarche and he would not be there to expand on it. We finally concluded that Mr Tesh should see Nguyen Co Thach as soon as he got back to Hanoi in the third week in August and, if there were no fresh developments by then, he could make a much more effective oral demarche in a general discussion about relations between our two countries.

3. Hong Kong Chinese. Mr Tesh was concerned about Mr Maideen's safety and said that there was a firm recommendation on its way to us, backed by Sir M MacLehose, for giving him permanent British nationality. In any case, Mr Tesh would not trust the Vietnamese. If Mr Maideen stayed in Saigon after his temporary British passport lapsed (and I said I saw no prospect of a further extension), the Vietnamese might well arrest him, HMG would be powerless to help and he (Mr Tesh) would be personally most distressed. Thun it was important to proceed as we had originally planned, i.c. for Mr Maideen to leave in early autumn, ostensibly for a holiday in Hong Kong, and then not to go back. Fortunately the Chinese refugee problem would be largely over by then. I said that this was news to me! my understanding earlier in the year was that the backlog of refugees would build up through this year and the need to move them out possibly in increasing numbers - would continue until next year. Mr Tesh said that this was no longer the case and he thought that by September there would be only a few hundred Chinese left, none of whom would have a very good case for acceptance by Hong Kong We agreed that, if this was the case, there was certainly no need to proceed any further at present with our efforts to get Hong Kong officials installed temporarily in Saigon. Mr Tesh thought that, once Mr Maideen had left, if the refugee pressure did build up again, he would be on good ground for a fresh approach (I suggested to Nguyen Co Thach) to say that, as Mr Maideen was not coming back, and as it was in Vietnamese and British interests for the problem to he solved, the best way we could help was by sending Hong Kong officials temporarily to Saigon. If the Vietnamese turned

this suggestion down (and Mr Tesh gave the impression that there might be no need to make it after all), then the Embassy in Hanoi would just have to cope.

CONFIDENATAL

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