TNAG-0647-FCO40-795-Study-of-labour-relations-in-Hong-Kong-by-Professor-H-A-Turn-1977 — Page 275

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First, China controls the left unions and appears to be unwilling to let union officials have anything at all to do with employers and representatives of government. This may be because they do not want to disturb a profitable (and politically safe) status quo-certainly the political economy of Kwangtung province at least would be negatively affected by disturbances leading to a takeover of K. It may be because union officials would be put at greater risk of being seen to fail their members if they negotiated with employers. In any case, Peking could not pursue this policy if there were mass dissatisfaction among the working class in HK. Second, the employers are set against dealing with communists and see no reason to alter the status uc in the absence of any pressure to do so. (This may be shortsighted, since a revival of 1967 conditions might not be so easily deflected next time and policies of reform introduced under the stimulus of mass unrest might be too late.) They are supported in this stand by their earlier successes whenever class war has broken out in the Colony the history of strikes, lockouts, police action. etc. has gone pretty well in favour of the employers. Third, the right-wing unions are weak and unrepresentative: in the past they have often been corrupt.

Fourth, as long as economic growth is sustained, individualism will continue to be more rational than defensive/aggressive combinations of workers which depend on strong solidority and low mobility for success in struggles with employers. Fifth, a population made up of first and second generation refugees, with increasingly limited possibilities of international migration, is likely to feel vulnerable in the face of clear opposition by employers to collective organization of workers: IIK is the last stop for many of them and they just don't want to rock the boat. Sixth, the heterogeneity of HK's industry and the relative volatility of its demand for labour is not conducive to the growth of unions, which have thrived elsewhere on large single-industry concentrations and monopsonistic employment conditions. Finally, profileration of 'unions' at both firm and industry levels has institutionalized competition between rival organisations, a factor strengthened by government's resistance to amalgamation and federation. This has weakened the development of a union movement for which in any case there seems to be very limited popular support.

9. The part played by combinations of emplovers in regulating the labour market :

If labour has virtually no collective role to play in the labour market, the same could not be said for employers. The general functions of employers associations we covered in our notes; here we are concerned only with their effect on the labour market. The information flows promoted by these organizations have been discussed in section 2; we are now in a position to assess the evidence for collusion between employers to regulate rates. That collusion is normal is supported by numerous references in the notes, Few employers readily admit to it and, as there are no formal collective agreements either at firm or industry levels, informal co-ordination of wages policy can easily be passed off as "an exchange of information which in no way affects the antonomy of individual firms". There have been and are some determined efforts to maintain a united front on wages: the large American electronics firms tried

· an d failed; the British-dominated utilities sector appears to be among the most successful in this respect; the cotton spinners may be represented alternatively as a divided tea-house clique or as an extremely coherent, disciplined body. It is not even clear whether two complementary monopolies like the electricity companies are able to agree not to compete for each