TNAG-0641-FCO40-789-Discussions-between-Hong-Kong-and-Macao-for-proposed-constru-1977 — Page 55

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simultaneously, the holding areas would have to be merged into one, unless the Macau Authorities could obtain permission for a hold to the west of Macau over the China mainland so that there would be no overlapping. A single holding area for both airports would, of course, make a single approach authority mandatory. A common holding area could also reduce the handling capability of Chek Lap Kok under certain weather conditions because of the need to reserve space in the holding stack for Macau traffic.

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In summary,

should Kai Tak not be replaced, the ATC difficulties presented by a Macau runway aligned roughly North/South would not seem insurmountable and might be acceptable in order to obtain a "Hong Kong feeder airport" at Macau to cope with traffic in excess of Kai Tak's handling capability. (As you are aware, this over-capacity situation is presently expected to arise around the mid 1980, therefore para. 1 of the draft reply to the Portuguese memorandum is inaccurate.) An East/West runway would pose very much greater ATC difficulties, and its acceptability would need to be studied in the light of much more detailed information, e.g. approach paths over China, guidance systems, etc.

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Should Chek Lap Kok be built, the presence of an airport at Macau could pose unacceptable constraints on the use of Chek Lap Kok. Under this circumstance, the airport at Macau would in any case be largely redundant, for fast-ferries and feeder-aircraft/helicopters could make the journey from the airport to Macau in only a little more time than to central Hong Kong, and the dual runway capacity could adequately meet the demands of both Hong Kong and Macau.

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My conclusion, therefore, is that until the future of Kai Tak is known, it is in Hong Kong's interests to deter the Macau authorities from building an airport.

If we

are to remain at Kai Tak, much more detailed information is required of the Macau proposals to determine whether a Macau Airport is operationally compatible. The effects of such an airport on British airline and other economic interests would also need to be studied in depth. If, on the other hand, a decision is made to proceed with Chek Lap Kok, we should firmly oppose a Macau Airport on the grounds that this would produce unacceptable air traffic control problems and could restrict the capacity of Chek Lap Kok.

RED:ac

R. Daring.

(R.E. Downing)

Director of Civil Aviation

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