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(a)
the base levels at which the quotas themselves are
to be fixed, and here there are two important proposals."
"One is to allow variable reference periods in exceptional
cases where the importing country is in difficulty. At present this right extends only to exporting countries."
32.
The present MFA provides for the base levels in Article 3 agreements to be tied to a base period which is in turn tied
to the date of request for consultations. Where exports have been increasing rigidly, this permits importing countries to "roll-back" imports to a level well below the recent rate of
exports.
33.
There is a provision that if this reference named is "specially adverse for a particular exporting country due to abnormal circumstances, the past performance of imports from that country over a period of years should be taken into account."
34.
There is no similar provision for importing countries and so in theory this provicicn favours exporting countries. But in practice, as far as we know the present wording has rarely if ever been successfully invoked to an exporting country's advantage (we tried to invoke it in our negotiations with the Community in 1975 without success). The amendment suggested could no doubt be used to the severe disadvantage of the exporting
countries.
35.
The existing provisions provide one of the few safe- guards that exporting countries have in the present MTA and to remove it would be to tip the balance in favour of importing countries, if the balance is not already in favour of the latter.
36.
The base period level provided for in Article 3 is there
to protest exporting countries against excessive cutback by giving then a minimum level, There are two reasons why no such provision would be appropriate in hrticle 4. The first is the existence of the provisions that Article 4 agreements must be mutually acceptable
and on overall terms more liberal than Article 3 measures. The
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